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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANZ B. SCHICK and MARYEVE 
S. SCHICK, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
RAYMOND J. ASHTON, RAYMOND 
L. EVANS AND B. EUGENE BRA-
ZIER, a partnership, doing business 
as ASHTON, EVANS & BRAZIER, 
Architects and Engineers. 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8651 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiffs, appellants in this court, commenced the 
action in the court below by a complaint in which they 
sought to recover from the defendants, respondents in 
this court, as architects, for allegedly negligently and care-
lessly designing and providing specifications for a heating 
system to be installed in a home constructed for plaintiffs 
in Salt Lake County, Utah. (R 1) Defendant denied the 
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plaintiff's allegations and counterclaimed for the balance 
of their architectural fee. (R 3-5) The case was tried to 
a jury. The jury returned a verdict of "no cause of action" 
on the plaintiffs' complaint, and awarded damages to the 
defendants on their counterclaim against plaintiffs in the 
amount of $400.00. (R 58-59) Plaintiffs and appellants 
prosecute this appeal from the judgment of the court 
entered in accordance with the verdict, (R 68), and from 
the order of the court denying plaintiffs' motion for New 
trial. ( R 68) 
Hereinafter the parties will be referred to in this 
brief as they respectively appear in this court "appellants" 
and "respondents". 
Respondents are not in agreement with the statement 
of facts as set forth in the brief of the appellants. The 
Statement of Facts as set forth in the appellants' brief 
is an argumentive summary of portions of the testimony 
and evidence before the jury in the court below. To make 
a detailed analysis of the controverted factual statements 
set forth in appellants' brief would appear to serve no 
useful purpose herein, but in compliance with rule 75 
(P) (2) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, we do point out 
by way of example one or two of the discrepancies noted 
in the appellants' statement of facts. 
At Page 2 of appellants brief are set forth supposed 
admission of fact by respondents as follows: 
"They admit that they agreed to and did pre-
pare specifications and working drawings to meet 
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local climatic conditions, and that they obtained 
bids for the construction of the home and let con-
tracts for the same and agreed to and did super-
vise the construction to completion. (R 1, 3-4)" 
When the text of the actual admissions as set forth 
in respondents' answer is examined, it is found that the 
defendants admitted to having, 
"On or about April 1, 1952, in consideration of 
an agreed fee of 6% of the total construction cost to 
plaintiffs, to be paid by plaintiffs to defendants, en-
tered into an oral contract whereby defendants a-
greed to perform certain professional services for 
plaintiffs pertaining to construction of a house for 
plaintiffs at 2173 Pheasant Way, Holladay, Salt 
Lake County, Utah; allege that said home was origi-
nally designed by Richard J. Neutra, an architect of 
Los Angeles, California, and at the special instance 
and request of plaintiffs, defendants modified said 
design to meet local climatic conditions, to meet spe-
cific requirements of plaintiffs including the cooling 
cycle for air conditioning; defendants further a-
greed to and did prepare specifications and working 
drawings based upon said design as modified in the 
particulars as above set forth; defendants agreed to 
and did obtain bids for the construction of said 
home in accordance with said modified design, but 
plaintiffs refused to accept any of the bids so ob-
tained and on plaintiff's own initiative and inde-
pendent of defendants obtained a general contrac-
tor and heating subcontractor by direct negotiation, 
and plaintiffs did let said contracts upon conditions 
at variance with the contract documents as prepared 
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by defendants, all for the purpose of meeting plain-
tiffs' requirements for reduction of construction 
costs and for other matters of personal preference; 
defendants agreed to and did supervise said con-
struction to completion based upon the contract as 
let by plaintiffs, but plaintiffs entered into certain 
verbal agreements with said contractors agreeing 
upon changes in requirements under the construc-
tion documents, all without the knowledge or ap-
proval of defendants" (R 3-4). (Italics ours) 
As a further example of the misleading character of 
the appellants' statement of facts is the statement appear-
ing at Page 7 of appellants' brief wherein without any 
reference to the parts of the record supporting the state-
ment, appellants say, 
"Defendants never made a full and adequate 
balance and test of the completed system as they 
had admittedly undertaken to do as a specific term 
of the oral contract, but certain tests were made by 
the defendants in connection with the adequacy of 
the air delivery system." 
The testimony on this point by Mr. Brazier, one of the 
defendants and respondents, is as follows: 
"Q. And as a result of the test or tests which 
you made did you come to any conclusion as to its 
adequacy for heating the house? 
A. After, I believe that it was the second test that 
I witnessed and recorded with Mr. Olsen and taking 
into consideration all of the previous corrections 
that we made to the system and taking the result 
of that test:.and the previous test, I came to the 
conclusion that it was satisfactory." (R 552) 
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Because of the inaccuracies noted in the appellants' 
statements of facts, respondents choose to make their own 
statment of facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Franz B. Schick and Maryeve S. Schick, plaintiffs 
and appellants herein are husband and wife. (R 1) De-
fendants and respondents herein are architects and engin-
eers licensed to practice in the State of Utah. (R 1 & 3) 
Appellants employed one Richard J. Neutra of Los Angeles, 
California, a noted architect and designer of residences to 
draw plans and specifications for the construction of a 
residence for the appellants, said residence to be located 
at 2173 Pheasant Way in Holladay, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. (R 336) A contract was duly made and entered into 
with Mr. Neutra by appellants. (R 336 and R 600 Ex 36) 
Mr. Neutra became ill and was unable to complete his 
assignment, or so he apparently advised Dr. Schick. (R 95 
and 347) Appellants having been previously acquainted 
with B. Eugene Brazier, one of the respondents, prevailed 
upon him to undertake the assignment of taking over the 
design of Mr. Neutra and completing the necessary plans, 
making such adaptations as were necessary for local con-
ditions and to supervise the construction of the residence 
basing their design on Neutra's plans, including an air-
floor heating system originally proposed to N eutra and 
acceptable to appellants. (R 93 and 96) Respondents pre-
pared plans and specifications for the construction of the 
residence of appellants. (R 83 and ~75) The plans and 
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specifications were let out to contractors by respondents 
for bid and bids were returned for the construction of 
the residence in accordance with the plans and specifica-
tions, but the bids were higher than expected and the ap-
pellants rejected all the bids. (R 104-5, 375) Respondent 
Brazier offered to re-design the residence, eliminating some 
of the features and to obtain new bids on the re-designed 
structure. (R 548) Appellants rejected this suggestion. 
(R 548) Appellants, acting on a suggestion by Brazier, 
undertook to find some less well known contractors to see 
if a lower bid could be obtained. (R 377) By eliminating 
some features such as the cooling cycle in the air condi-
tioning system, and by substituting hot air furnaces for 
the heating equipment designed by the respondents, and 
by making other changes and substitutions in the plan in 
general, appellants succeeded in getting bids from Nelson, 
Pierce and Hogenson, general contractors, for the con-
struction of the residence and from Modern Aire for the 
installation of a modified heating system. (R 378-9) The 
heating system as designed by respondents was never ac-
tually constructed and put into operation. ( R 224 and 446, 
477) The modifications in the heating system desired by 
Dr. Schick for the purpose of decreasing the cost were 
discussed by Dr. Schick with Mr. Brazier who explained 
that while the modified systein would probably heat 
the premises satisfactorily, performance comparable with 
that of the designed system could not be expected. (R 108) 
The residence was constructed incorporating the modified 
heating system for which Dr. Schick had obtained bids. 
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The respondents supervised the construction of the resi-
dence and saw that all of the construction was performed 
in accordance with the contract meticulously well and par-
ticularly with respect to the heating system. (R 110) Tests 
performed by respondents and by experts employed by 
Dr. Schick disclosed that certain restrictions existed in 
the underfloor return air system of the installation and 
corrective measures were taken which, according to the 
tests conducted subsequent to making the correction, elimi-
nated the deficiency. (R 442-513) The cause of the de-
ficiency was unknown, but resulted from some restriction, 
the exact nature of which could not be determined. (R 442) 
The difficulty did not result from design. (R 442) Despite 
the results of tests by both engineers employed by Schick 
and by respondents, which reflected the adequacy of the 
system to heat the home, Dr. Schick and his wife remained 
dissatisfied with the heating system (R 514-390) and 
brought suit claiming respondents negligently designed the 
heating system so that when constructed the same was in-
adequate. (R 1) Such additional facts as may be necessary 
to the complete development of the case will be set forth 
in the argument. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
The Statement of Points upon which appellants rely 
as set forth in appellants' brief will be followed by respon-
dents in answering the contentions of the appellants. How-
ever, in the interest of space the points of appellants will 
be more briefly stated and the converse of the appellants' 
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point is, of course, relied upon by the respondents. Thus 
stated, the points upon which respondents rely are as 
follows: 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMIT-
TING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF RESPON-
DENT'S LIABILITY. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY IN ANY MANNER 
WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE APPELLANTS. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, 8 AND 10, NOR IN MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS 
5, 9, 12-A. 
POINT IV. 
THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT ADVERSELY 
AFFECTED BY ANY INCONSISTENCY IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 6 AND 10. 
POINT V. 
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
It is noted that appellants did not comply in setting 
forth the Argument in their brief with Rule 75 (P) (2) 
( 4) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, "the 
argument, under separate subdivisions at the beginning 
of each of which appears in full the point or points dis-
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cussed therein." Rather appellants chose to set forth en-
tirely new headings for the argument. We interpret the 
brief of appellants that their first heading in the Argu-
ment covers Point 1 of their statement of points; heading 
No. 2, covers points 2 through 4; and heading No. 3, 
covers point No. 6. We do not find that points 5 or 7 are 
argued in the appellants' brief and we, therefore, assume 
that the same were abandoned. Our Argument for con-
venience, in so far as may be feasible, will be similarly 
grouped. We conform to the rule as stated and set forth 
our argument under the point or points to which it re-
lates, rather than under the headings of appellants. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SUBMIT-
TING TO THE JURY THE QUESTION OF RESPON-
DENT'S LIABILITY. 
Without citing any authority in support thereof, ap-
pellants have, throughout the trial and in their discus-
sion under Point I of their Argument, contended that 
respondents are liable in damages to appellants if the ap-
pellants were not satisfied with the heating systems in 
the house for which appellants engaged the respondents as 
architects to draw plans and supervise the construction. 
The appellants' position ignores both the facts and the 
law. We shall deal first with the facts. 
Appellants did not engage respondents to act as archi-
tects and engineers in connection with the residential con-
struction in the first instance. They first engaged Richard 
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J. Neutra. (R 336) Only upon Neutra's inability to com-
plete the commission did they turn to the respondents and 
the relationship which was then formulated was very 
informal and consisted solely of a verbal agreement (R 
91) Basically the terms of the verbal agreement as out-
lined by Mr. Brazier, one of the respondents, were that the 
respondents were required to prepare all necessary work-
ing drawings, adhering to the design of Richard Neutra, 
with adaptations requested by the owner; take bids and 
prepare contracts between owner and contractor; approve 
shop drawings; supervise construction with regard to the 
conformity with all contractual documents; prepare de-
tails required for interpretation of construction plans; 
with regard to the heating and air conditioning system, 
the basic design incorporated by Richard N eutra was ac-
cepted by the owner and concurred in by the respondents 
and the respondents were required to establish by accepted 
engineering principles the size and type of the units neces-
sary to the operation of the system, and of the duct runs 
and registers and upon completion of construction, to bal-
ance and check the performance for maximum efficiency. 
For this service, the respondents were to receive a fee of 
6% of the total construction cost. ( R 92, 93) The heating 
system chosen by Neutra and concurred in by Dr. Schick 
and his wife was known as an Airfloor System. ( R 600 Ex. 
39, 52) Mr. Brazier testified that the Airfloor design and 
plan was furnished to him with the plans from Neutra, 
all of which were turned over to him by Dr. Schick. (R 
100) The plan referred to was introduced as Exhibit 19. 
10 
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(R 600 Ex. 19, R 100) Dr. Schick attempted to testify 
that he had never heard of the Airfloor System and was 
"scared to death" of it, but on closer examination had to 
admit that Mr. Brazier had told him that he was not 
familiar with the systen1 and accordingly Dr. Schick, who 
had been corresponding with the Airfloor people and had 
in turn had them correspond with Neutra, (R 600 Ex. 39) 
arranged a meeting between Mr. Brazier and Mr. Leemhuis 
of Airfloor Company because he wanted Mr. Brazier to 
become familiar with the system. ( R 368) The contradic-
tory, and evasive character of the testimony of Dr. Schick 
is noteworthy on this particular point. Commencing at 
page 366 of the Record appears the following exchange, 
"Q. Now, Dr. Schick, you were very impressed 
with the idea of an airfloor furnace, weren't you, 
with the airfloor system"? (At witnesses request 
the question was repeated). A. "Not at all. I was 
scared to death. I had never heard of it before." 
Q. "Do I understand it is your testimony that you 
were forced to accept this then by someone?" "A. 
I wouldn't put it in these words but I told Mr. 
Brazier that, 'Here is a local firm, Gritton and 
Wilde, who had a specific proposal, very specific.' I 
sent to Mr. Brazier the representative of Walter 
Lloyd Company, a most honorable and best known 
firm that proposed also a different system. I had 
Mr. Brazier look at the Federal Oil Company, an-
other system and I said to Mr. Brazier, 'Listen, I 
have never in my life before heard of that air-
floor system. Don't you want to consider something 
else?' And he rejected it all. He said, 'You leave it 
up to me. This will take, I guarantee.' That is the 
truth." 
11 
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Q. "So that you did all of the investigation 
on the systems, not only the airfloor system, but 
all the others, didn't you, Dr. Schick?" 
A. "I didn't do any investigation. I told Mr. 
Brazier Mr. Neutra's original advice to get the 
Gritton and Wilde, the second one in all. I am a 
Professor and I tried to cooperate honestly when I 
was asked originally by Mr. Neutra to give him 
a few firms, the names of reputable firms that 
have different systems, so I did. And that is what 
Mr. Brazier took over. There was no specific sys-
tem and logically, all I can do is, I am a simple logi-
cal professor of philosophy. I can think logically. 
I am not technical and when something comes to me 
of which I have never heard before, which was en-
tirely new, of course, I was a little doubtful and I 
said to Brazier, 'Won't you consider a few other 
things?' But he rejected them all and always came 
back with the answer, 'This is my responsibility.' 
You have got to trust me.' You read it in the letter. 
'You have got to trust me.'" 
Q. "Then how did it happen that Mr. Neutra 
in his correspondence, which has been introduced, 
is talking about the airfloor forms?" 
A. "This is one of the many suggestions which 
he received." 
Q. "And do you recall a man by the name of 
Leenhuis ?" 
A. "That is the owner of the Airfloor Com-
pany of California." 
Q. "And do you recall inviting Mr. Leenhuis 
to come here and see you and meet Mr. Brazier?" 
A. "Yes sir. Because I was scared to death 
and I thought it would be a good idea to have at 
12 
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least the owner of that firm to come to Mr. Brazier 
and explain what that system was all about, because 
he told me he had never heard of it." 
Q. "So you invited Mr. Leenhuis to come heY.e 
and you did introduce him to Mr. Brazier?" 
A. "That's right." 
Respondents acquitted their responsibility to design 
the system and to prepare plans thereof and the plans 
which they drew were introduced into evidence. (R 601) 
However, the system as designed by the respondents was 
never built. (R 224, 446-7, 477) Due to the fact that the 
cost of building the proposed residence exceeded the amount 
which Schicks desired to spend, the bids received from 
contractors were all rejected. (R 104, 375) The offer of 
Mr. Brazier to re-design the house was refused by Dr. 
Schick. ( R 548) Schick undertook personally to find a 
contractor and subcontractors, particularly the heating sub-
contractor and to get the house built for what he could 
pay. (R 378) He was not able to do so, however, and re-
tain all of the features of the plan as designed by respon-
dents. (R 378-384) He was compelled to delete many fea-
tures from the heating system as designed by respondents. 
As a money-saving measure the cooling cycle was elimi-
nated. (R 383) The heating source was changed from that 
designed by respondents to two hot air furnaces. (R 383) 
The fans were changed from the type designed by respon-
dents to simply make use of the fans incorporated in the 
hot air furnaces. (R 156, 157 and 166) The concrete under 
the airfloor forms was eliminated to save cost. (R 549) 
13 
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Instead of a vertical discharge register in front of the big 
windows in the living room, as designed and specified by 
respondents, another type of register discharging into the 
room was installed. (R 171, 172) Not one witness ever 
tied the system as installed to the respondents. It was ad-
mitted that the designed system was good. (R 224, 600 Ex. 
56 Letter Dated April 11, 1955) At all times during con-
struction and thereafter Schicks were employing other 
experts to check on respondents' work in the matter of the 
heating system. (R 450-1) They never at any time relied 
on Ashton, Evans and Brazier for counsel on the heating 
system. They employed, during and after construction, the 
following engineers and architects to check on the work 
of respondents, Stephen MacDonald, architect, (R 272) 
Professor William S. Olsen, (R 273) Gerald E. Wright, 
Jr., consulting engineer, (R 274) Mr. Gollaher, engineer, 
(R 406, 600 Ex. 56) Mr. Howard J. Hassell, engineer (R 
119). Of all of these persons employed, the appellants called 
only one as a witness, Howard J. Hassell. (R 117) Res-
pondents called William S. Olsen as their witness. (R 
420) Mr. Hassell, the engineer relied upon by appellants 
to prove that the system designed by respondents was de-
fective, admitted that the system as installed was not 
the system as designed by respondents. (R 158-165) He 
stated he never saw a plan drawn by respondents calling 
for installation of hot air furnaces as actually installed. 
( R 224) He testified that he found only one possible de-
fect in the design and that was a restriction in the cold 
air return around the fireplace. (R 179) Mr. Hassell ad-
14 
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mitted that if, instead of being installed as drawn, an 
additional tier of airfloor forms were added in the cold 
air return system in that area the return air would be 
increased by 20%. ( R 577-8) The contractor who in-
stalled the air floor forms, Milo Cazier of Modern Aire, 
testified that an additional tier of airfloor forms was in-
stalled at the point of the supposed restriction. (R 480) 
The testimony of this Milo Cazier was never re-butted in 
any way. 
As to the actual installation, it was the conclusion 
of all of the witnesses that testified, save and except Mr. 
Hassell who testified for the appellants, that the system 
as installed was adequate. (R 441, 514, 485) Reports of 
the engineers were introduced into evidence, air volumes 
were shown, but Mr. Hassell, the only one who did not 
find the installed system would deliver sufficient air, was 
unable to state why the system did not deliver sufficient 
air and when questioned closely on certain of the details 
of his test he was unable to explain certain discrepancies 
in his report. He stated in his report that the load placed 
upon the motors in the hot air furnace blower units re-
sulted from the attempt of the fans to suck air. (R 199) 
Yet, when examined on the characteristics of these fans 
in operation, he had to admit that the fans did not derive 
their load from sucking air, but from delivering air. (R 
202) The examination of Mr. Hassell in this connection 
is most enlightening for while he admitted all of the facts 
which impeached the statement in his report, he refused 
to admit that the report was in error. (R 202-3) 
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The primary complaint of the appellants was that 
they were cold and the windows frosted in the winter. (R 
260) Yet not one person other than appellants themselves 
ever testified that the house was cold. The record is re-
plete with engineering computations on air delivery, supply, 
return, etc., but not even the engineers said the house was 
cold or that it couldn't be heated with the equipment in-
stalled. No one ever found fault with the work which was 
done in making the installation. Mr. Hassell indicated 
he believed insulation should have been installed around 
the perimeter of the air floor forms. (R 175) The con-
tractor who installed the insulation testified to its installa-
tion and demonstrated to the jury from photographs in-
traduced in evidence taken by Dr. Schick that it was in-
stalled and visible during construction. (R 478-479) The 
Schicks insisted on the installation of time clocks to provide 
a night shutback in operating the system against the ad-
vice of all persons concerned. ( R 485-6-7) l\Ir. Hassell, 
Schicks' engineer recognized that this type of system re-
quired continuous operation to provide heat. (R 181-182) 
Schicks claimed they did not use the clocks and that the 
house was cold though the furnaces ran all of the time 
(R 288 & 390) Mr. Ted R. Brown, expert on heat-
ing employed by Ashton, Evans and Brazier, made a 
computation from the fuel bills introduced in evidence 
by appellants, (R 600, Ex. 50), using accepted mathema-
tical and engineering principles which proved that the 
furnaces, or "heat exchangers" as Mr. Brown called them, 
were actually in operation in the Schick residence only 
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twenty-two and one half per cent of the time during the 
heating season defined as from October 1st through May 
30th. (R 521) Mr. Brown testified that from tests made 
personally on the system installed he found the system ade-
quate vvith the changes incorporated during the tests and 
during construction to heat the house. (R 514) Mr. Brazier 
testified to the same effect. (R 552) Mr. Olson, an engineer 
employed by Schicks, testified as to the recommendations he 
had made during construction and stated that if his recom-
mendations were carried out, the system would be satisfac-
tory. (R 429) By other witnesses it was proved, namely 
Mr. Brown, Mr. Cazier and Mr. Brazier, that Mr. Olson's 
recommendations were adopted and carried out. (R 482, 
512, 523, 514, 552) The facts may then be summarized that 
the respondents were never the designers of the heating 
system as actually installed. The system which was con-
tracted for by Schick was installed meticulously well. (R 
110) The system as installed was adequate to heat the 
house. (R 514) 
In view of all of the facts since appellants did not 
buy the heating system designed by respondents, are the 
respondents nevertheless responsible in damages for the 
fact that Dr. Schick and his wife subjectively state that 
they were cold and that the heating system designed by de-
fendants was defective? We believe that the appellants 
wholly and completely failed to show any fault on the part 
of the repondents which gave rise to the complaint of appel-
lants, or to establish any basis for asserting liability against 
respondents. 
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The law is clear that an architect in performing his 
duties is not held to a standard of perfection. In a recent 
annotation on the subject of an Architects Liability appear-
ing in 25 ALR 2d at page 1085, the annotating authority 
at page 1086 says, 
"By his contract, the architect implies that he' 
possesses the necessary competence and ability, in-
cluding taste, to enable him to furnish plans and 
specifications prepared with a reasonable degree 
of technical skill, and such as would produce, if 
followed and adhered to, a building of the kind 
called for, without marked defects in character, 
strength or appearance. This skill and ability which 
he is bound to exercise are such as are ordinarily 
required of architects, which is a higher degree than 
that required of unskilled persons. In testing the 
architect's competence, h o w e v e r, consideration 
should be given only to the knowledge that was 
available to his profession at the time he was em-
ployed. The architect's undertaking in the absence 
of a special agreement, does not imply or guaran-
tee a perfect plan or a satisfactory result." (Italics 
ours) 
In the case of White vs. Pallay, 119 Oregon 97, 247 
P. 316, the court was confronted with a case in which the 
plaintiff sought to recover for his services as architect 
in the preparation of sketches, drawings, plans, details 
and specifications for the erection of a building in Port-
land and in superintending the erection thereof. Defendant 
contended that the plans were defective in regard to the 
foundation, and in fact the evidence showed that during 
construction the building settled and remedial steps had to 
be taken which cost the defendant about $1700. The theory 
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of the defendant was that he contracted for plans and 
specifications which when carried out would produce a 
certain agreed result. In substance, his position was that 
t1e plaintiff (architects) warranted that the plans and 
specifications would produce that result, and because they 
failed and required amendment, and betterment of the 
foundation became necessary that the plaintiff must re-
spond in damages. The court quotes the rule above quoted 
from the annotating authority with approval citing 5 
Corpus Juris 269. The court continued, 
"It is out of place at this juncture to review the 
testimony and quote therefrom. The trier of the fact 
the judge before whom the case was heard without 
a jury, has determined the facts by his findings, 
and although, there may be room for dispute in the 
declaration of the witnesses, we can only say that 
there is evidence supporting the conclusions reached 
by the judge who heard the case. 
"There is nothing in the record indicating that 
the plaintiff gave any warranty as to the results 
of his plans and specifications. Warranties must be 
complied with strictly, and must be true as stated 
at all hazards. (citing cases) The precedents cited 
by defendant treat the question of the liability of 
the architect as one of fact, and hold that he must 
act with reasonable diligence in the performance 
of his duties. The great weight of authority is that 
this is the measure of the duty of the architect. 
In the instant case, the question is about whether 
the foundation of the building was sufficient, con-
sidering the nature of the ground upon which it 
was erected, and there is testimony from which the 
trier of the fact could determine that the plaintiff 
exercised reasonable care and diligence in the exam-
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ination of the site and in the preparation of the 
plans and specifications. This being true in point 
of fact as found beyond our power to gainsay, the 
plaintiff performed his full duty and is not liable in 
damages." 
In the case of Palmer v. Brown, 127 California App. 
2d 44, 273 P. 2d 306, while the facts involved many other 
facets of the architect's responsibility one of the points 
raised before the court was the acquittal of the architect's 
duty in a supervisory capacity and the California court 
held that the manner in which the duties were acquitted 
by the architect were issues of fact and should be submited 
to the jury and said, 
"While concededly the architects undertaking, 
absent a special agreement, is not an absolute guar-
anty that satisfactory results will ensue, see White 
v. Pallay, 119 Or. 97, 247 P. 316, Shipman v. State 
43 Wis. 381; Chapel v. Clark 117 Mich. 638, 76 NW 
62; there is evidence that the above defects might 
have been caused not merely by deficiencies in the 
materials used, but by plaintiff's failure to exercise 
reasonable care and diligence ·in the supervision 
of the work. Under the circumstances here present, 
these were issues of fact which should have gone 
to the jury." 
As to the effect of the owners dealing direct with the 
contractor independently of the architect we cite the case 
of Gaastra v. Holmes 36 New Mexico 175, 10 P 2d 589. 
In this case the architects sued for compensation for serv-
ices performed. The difference in the case resulted from 
defects in construction which the owner considered the 
fault of the architects, and for which the latter refused to 
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admit liability. It appeared that the owner had himself 
let a number of the contracts and that the architect super-
vised the construction under the contracts as let by the 
owners, and the court held : "Where the owner has an 
independent relation to the contractor, the architect, of 
course, does not warrant the construction." 
In the instant case an attempt was made out by ap-
pellants to claim a special agreement because of the fact 
thc1t Mr. Brazier knew of the sensitivities of Dr. Schick 
in regard to heating systems. But no one, not even Dr. 
Schick, ever testified that respondents contracted to meet 
his personal requirements. The only testimony ever offered 
was that respondents were to design an "adequate system." 
We submit that the facts more than bear out respondents 
performed this duty. The issues in regard thereto were 
correctly submitted to the jury and by the jury found in 
favor of the respondents. No error is shown by appellants 
necessitating a reversal of this verdict. 
A word may be said about the manner in which the 
argument of the appellants repetitively ignors a most im-
portant fact. Throughout their argument on all points the 
appellants refer to the agreement of the respondents, "to 
design and install an adequate heating and cooling sys-
tem." The conjunctive "and" used by the appellants gives 
the impression that the act to be performed was a single 
act. In fact the appellants did design an excellent system, 
and as we have elsewhere pointed out with multiple refer-
ence to the record, no one attacked the basic soundness of 
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the system designed by the respondents. However, the sys-
tem as designed was never installed. This fact the appel-
lants continuously ignore. No effort was made and no 
proof was ever offered to show that the respondents Y:e~:e 
the authors or designers of the system which was actu-
ally incorporated into the Schick residence. The appellants 
seem to rely on a theory that because the respondents did 
not prevent the appellants by some means, from installing 
the inferior system, that they should be held responsible 
for any dissatisfaction with the inferior system installed. 
And this in the face of the testimony by Dr. and Mrs. 
Schick that they employed expert after expert for advice 
on the heating system they installed. Dr. Schick would not 
buy the system that appellants designed because it cost 
more than he wanted to spend. Because he bought a cheaper 
system is the designer of the original system responsible? 
We submit that the position of the appellants is untenable. 
Respondents response to the Argument of the appel-
lants set forth in their brief under the first heading in the 
Argument would not be complete without a brief comment 
on the cases cited by appellant. A review of the cases cited 
reflects that not one is in point or in any way stands for 
the principle for which it is apparently cited by the appel-
lant. The case of Adams Radiawr & Boiler Works Ltd., 
vs. Schnader, 26 Atl. 7 45, is a case involving a written 
contract for the installation of a steam heating apparatus 
manufactured by Adams Radiator in premises belonging 
to one Schnader. The contract, which was in essence a 
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sales contract, carried an express warranty in these words, 
"We guaranty this apparatus for heating by steam to be 
constructed in a good, thorough and workmanlike manner, 
to give entire satisfaction in its operation and to work 
entirely noiselessly. Should it prove unsatisfactory after a 
thorough and reasonable trial, we will remove it, * * *" 
The dissimilarity of the two cases, the one at bar and the 
cited case, and the inapplicability of the law of express 
warranty under a sales contract to the case before this 
court is so manifest we believe we need do no more than 
to point out to this court the nature of the cited case. 
Gerish v. Herold, (N. J.) 83 A. 898, is a case in which 
the court was required to interpret the effect on an owner 
who was suing on a building contract, of an architects rul-
ing as to the sufficiency of materials and construction. 
The court held that in that case where a specific 
written contract was involved, the architect's decision and 
certificates of completion issued in accordance therewith 
was not binding on the owner in an action against the 
builder. The applicability of any of the rulings of the court 
in that case to any of the circumstances in the instant case 
is not apparent from an examination of the facts in the 
two cases. 
Barnett v. Beggs (8th Cir.) 208 F. 255, is a case in-
volving the interpretation of a written contract between 
owner and architect which contract contained a clause 
requiring the plans and specifications to be prepared by 
the architect to "the satisfaction of the owner." The court 
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held that where a contract for architects services required 
plans and specifications satisfactory to the owner, the 
architects were bound to furnish plans satisfactory to the 
owner and not merely such as ought to have been satis-
factory. Again the inapplicability of the cited case to the 
case at bar is manifest. In the instant case there is not 
one single item of evidence or testimony which indicated 
that the plans and specifications were to be to the satis-
faction of the owner. Appellants, in their argument, admit 
that the most that could have ever been required would 
be an "adequate" heating system. Certainly in the absence 
of some express agreement the standards of adequacy are 
not the subjective tests applied by Dr. and Mrs. Schick. 
Morgan v. Gamble, Pa. 79 A. 410 is again a case in-
volving a building contract and the liability of the con-
tractor to meet the requirements of the owner where the 
contract in writing expressly provided that the contrac-
tor should furnish all materials and perform all work to the 
satisfaction of the owner. In this case the holding of the 
court is in direct conflict with the claim of the appellants 
herein that the issue is not one for the jury under such 
circumstances but is a matter of law. The court held: 
"We have uniformly upheld such contracts and 
required their observance. Under a contract of that 
character it is the duty of the contractor to per-
form to the satisfaction of the owner, and that is the 
standard by which the sufficiency of the work is 
to be tested. It is not for the court or the jury to 
determine whether the work is being done in com-
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pliance therewith, but solely for the owner to deter-
mine, and with his decision the contractor must 
comply. Of course, the dissatisfaction of the owner 
which will defeat a recovery by the contractor must 
be real and genuine, and not one prompted by cap-
rice or bad faith, or for the purpose of evading the 
balance due the contractor. If the objections made 
by the owner are bona fide, and not unreasonable 
or capricious, they must be sustained. The question 
is generally for the jury; but the evidence 'iJ'LaY be 
such as to require the court to withdraw the case 
from the jury." (Italics ours) 
In the instant case, not only was there no such con-
tract provision, verbal or written, as in the cited case, but 
we submit that an examination of the facts discloses that 
in the instant case the dissatisfaction of the owner, if any 
legitimate dissatisfaction existed, resulted entirely from 
his failure to buy the heating system designed by the res-
pondents and his substitution of the cheaper equipment. 
Under the facts in the instant case, we again reiterate 
that the case was very properly submitted to the jury 
and the jury has ruled thereon. 
The applicability of the Nagle v. City of Billings case, 
250 P. 445, to the case at bar escapes us completely. In 
that case the problem involved was the instructions given 
to a jury as to the liability of a city for inspection of its 
sidewalks to prevent injury to persons using the walk. The 
court found that the instruction given made the city an 
insurer of the safety of the persons using the walk, said 
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this was not the law and overruled the lower court. 
We submit that a review of the cases cited by the 
appellants does not disclose anything which points up any 
error in the proceedings by the lower court in the instant 
case in either fact or law. 
POINTS II, III, IV 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS IN-
STRUCTIONS TO THE JURY IN ANY MANNER 
WHICH ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE APPELLANTS. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING 
APPELLANTS' REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS 1, 2, 3, 
4, 6, 8 AND 10, NOR IN MODIFYING INSTRUCTIONS 
5, 9, 12-A. 
POINT IV. 
THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT ADVERSELY 
AFFECTED BY ANY INCONSISTENCY IN THE TRIAL 
COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS 6 AND 10. 
Since all of these points deal substantially with the 
same matter, the effect of the court's instructions on the 
action of the jury we shall present respondent's position on 
all three points as a consolidated argument. 
Appellants, at page 15 and 16 of their brief, com-
plain of the court's instruction No. 5. It is claimed by the 
appellants that the instruction ignores the express con-
tract between the parties whereby they assert respondents 
"agreed to install an adequate heating and cooling system, 
and, in terms of performance, represented that it would 
function properly". It is noteworthy that appellants make 
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no reference to the record to substantiate this statement. 
The reason is obvious because there is not one word in the 
record that respondents ever at any time in any manner 
"agreed to install an adequate heating and cooling sys-
tem." The respondents agreed to design an adequate heat-
ing system. ( R 93-4) and this they did. ( R 224-5, 600 Ex. 
56 Letter dated April 11, 1955) They agreed to supervise 
the construction and this they did. (R 110, 369-70) We have 
rather exhaustively reviewed the evidence on this matter 
under point I of this brief and we do not wish to belabor 
the court again on the same matter, but the basis of the 
appellants' complaint against instruction 5 in so far as 
the facts are concerned cannot be substantiated from the 
record. 
Furthermore, the instruction correctly states the law. 
We refer this court to an annotation covering the subject 
appearing in 25 ALR 2d at page 1093 wherein the anno-
tating authority cites several cases holding that an archi-
tect's undertaking to prepare plans did not imply or guar-
antee a perfect plan or satisfactory result. We also again 
refer to the case of White v. Pallay, the Oregon case pre-
viously cited 119 Or. 97, 247 P. 316 similarly holding. 
Appellants further complain of alleged inconsistency 
between instructions 6, 10 and 11 given by the court. 
Instruction 6 reads in accordance with established law 
down to the phrase added to the instruction by the court 
in favor of appellants as follows, "and in determining 
the degree of care, skill and ability to be used by the archi-
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tects, consideration may be given to the awareness by the 
architects of prior difficulties had by the Schicks with 
heating systems and the special sensitivities possessed by 
the Schicks." The instruction is in conformity wiC1 the lr.'v 
as set out by the cases cited in the annotation referred 
to at 25 ALR 2d 1087 except for the last phase of the in-
struction above quoted. This portion of the instruction 
is not the law and was objected to by the respondents at 
the time of trial. However, an examination of the language 
employed clearly reflects that the only party that could 
suffer injury as a result of the error were the respon-
dents. The architects, respondents herein, are held to a 
measure of performance never contemplated by law. The 
mere fact of awareness of the Schick sensibilities in regard 
to a heating system imposes absolutely no liability on the 
architects to meet the same in the absence of an express 
contract imposing upon them a duty to meet this sensiti-
vity, yet the instruction would permit the jury to take into 
consideration the sensitivity of the Schicks in connection 
with the determination of the standard of care which the 
architects were held to in their performance. Despite this 
instruction, the facts were so manifestly clear that there 
was no cause of action against the respondents the jury 
correctly returned a verdict on plaintiffs' complaint of 
"no cause of action". 
Instructions 10 and 11 complained of by the appel-
lants have no bearing on the action actually taken by the 
jury. These two instructions set out a measure of damages. 
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The language in instruction 10 is, we believe, reasonably 
clear and understandable by persons conversant with the 
English language. It is not required nor desired that a 
court attempt to interpret every word in an instruction. 
To do so would make instructions to the jury interminable 
in length and vastly confusing. A court is entitled to assume 
that the jury is composed of persons of a normal degree 
of understanding and if the instruction is so wordled as to 
be understandable to a person possessed of a normal de-
gree of understanding then it should be satisfactory as to 
clarity. We believe instruction 10 meets this standard, but 
even assuming that it did not do so the appellants are 
in no position to complain of the matter at this time. In 
making their objection to instruction 10, the appellants 
made no reference to any ambiguity in the terms of the 
instruction nor to any fault in its wording. Their objec-
tion was limited to the fact that they considered it incon-
sistent with the evidence and an incorrect statement of the 
law of damages. ( R 595) Furthermore, the instruction 
certainly had no bearing on the fact that the jury re-
turned a verdict of no cause of action. Had the jury re-
turned a verdict in which there was some question as to 
the amount of damages allowed the appellants, perhaps an 
argument might be made on the matter, but where the 
jury finds that the plaintiffs had no cause of action, the 
fact that the court instructed as to the measure of damages 
in language to which appellant objects would certainly be 
no basis for reversing the action of the jury in finding 
that no cause of action existed. 
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As to instruction No. 11, we cannot but note that this 
instruction is one requested by the appellants themselves. 
That it is inconsistent with the other instructions is mani-
fest. Appellants admit in their brief at page 10 e1at the 
respondents recognized this as a contract action. Unfor-
tunately, the appellants did not recognize what kind of an 
action was before the court. They insisted upon recovery 
for items of claimed damage which generally in the absence 
of special circumstances never proved in this case, have 
no place in an action on contract, towit pain and suffer-
ing, mental anguish, etc. (R 328, and instruction 11, R 29) 
The law is well established that these classifications of dam-
age are not generally recoverable in a contract action. The 
applicable law of damages in a contract action requires that 
the claimed damage must reasonably be within the contem-
plation of the parties. We cannot find that the Supreme 
Court of Utah has ruled on whether mental anguish and suf-
fering, etc. are recoverable in a contract action such as the 
case at bar. However, a good statement of the general 
rule is found in Volume 15 Am. Jur., "DAMAGES", Page 
599, Sec. 182 - Breach of Contract. -
"Damages for mental anguish are not as a 
general rule, recoverable in actions for breach of 
contract unless the breach amounts in substance 
to a wilful or independent tort. According to the 
weight of authority, mental anguish is not consider-
ed an element of recovery in an action for viola-
tion of an ordinary contract, as for example, one 
for the payment of money. Recovery therefore has 
been denied in a number of cases where such men-
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tal anguish and suffering were the only damages 
or where they are not accompanied by physical 
injury. In some states, however, mental anguish 
or suffering is a proper element of damage in ac-
tions for breach of contract, at least where it may 
be said that such anguish is the natural result of 
the breach or where it may reasonably be held 
to have been within the contemplation of the parties 
at the time of entering into the contract as a prob-
able result of its bre.ach. * * *" (Italics ours) 
In the case before this court it could certainly never 
be said that it was within the contemplation of the parties 
to the contract at the time that respondents agreed to per-
form service as architects for appellants as has been here-
tofore set forth in some detail, that the mental anguish 
and pain and suffering appellants claim they suffered be-
cause they claim the house was cold and the bills for fuel 
and electricity appellants were required to pay for opera-
tion of the heating system were possible elements of dam-
age in the event of a breach of the contract by the res-
pondents. 
However, we again wish to emphasize the fact that the 
error in the instruction is not a basis for the reversal of 
the action of the lower court because it related solely to 
the question of damages. The jury did not demonstrate any 
uncertainty on the question of damages. It simply found 
that the plaintiff - appellants herein, had no cause of 
action. In view of these facts, we submit that the error 
in the instructions, which in any event was only damaging 
to the respondents, not the appellants, constitutes no ground 
for reversal. 
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With respect to the objection stated at page 16 of 
appellants' brief to instruction 9, at the trial the appel-
lants raised no objection to instruction No. 9. It is in fact 
simply the requested instruction of the appellants No. 5 
with a small deletion and an addition by the court, but 
states the law just as the appellants contended for the law. 
(R 18) That the instruction is erroneous is true, and it 
was objected to by the respondents at the trial, but again 
the error militates in favor of the appellants, not against 
them, and consequently the appellants cannot be heard 
to complain of its affect upon the jury. Certainly, it would 
be a bizarre and inequitable thing if a party to an action 
can request an erroneous instruction and then use his own 
error as a basis for reversal of the decision by the court 
below. 
Since the appellants do not argue the matter of the 
failure of the court to give their requested instructions 
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8 and 10, except as the same may be in-
volved in the argument on the alleged error in the court's 
instructions which we have answered as above, we will 
make no specific argument on this point, but "·e do direct 
this court's attention to the instructions which were re-
fused, and we submit that the refusal to give the requested 
instructions was justified inasmuch as they are not in 
'harmony with either the law, or the evidence which was 
then before the court. 
In this regard American Jurisprudence on Appeal and 
Error, Volume 3, Page 334, Section 773, states, 
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"The general rule that the appellants' brief 
must be so prepared that all questions presented by 
the assignment of errors can be determined by an 
examination of the briefs and question not so pre-
sented are deemed waived, applies to errors in the 
giving or refusing of instructions." 
That this is the rule in this court is established by the 
case of Felkner v. Smith, decided by this court March 12, 
1931, 77 Utah 410, 296 P. 776. In that case the court said 
of a contention with regard to timely presentation of a 
negotiable instrument set up in the assignment of errors 
but not argued to the court, "That assignment of error 
is not argued in appellants' brief, and therefore is deemed 
waived." 
We wish to consider briefly the cases cited by appel-
lants in their brief in support of the argument that the 
mere fact of inconsistency in the instructions to the jury 
is sufficient grounds to justify a reversal. 
State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P. 2d 647 is a criminal 
case. The defendant was accused of indecent assault of a 
twelve year old female child. The trial judge instructed 
the jury that, 
"It is not necessary for the State to prove the 
alleged offense, if any, was committed on the 20th 
day of July, but any date on or about that time is 
sufficient if you find from a preponderance of the 
evidence that the offense charged was committed 
under substantially the conditions detailed by the 
witnesses for the State." 
Defendant contended that the instruction deprived 
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him of the right to have the jury pass on his alibi which 
covered the date in question. The court said : 
"It is proper to refuse, and error to give con-
flicting and contradictory instructions, since a 
charge containing two distinct propositions conflict-
ing with each other tends so to confuse the jury 
as to prevent their rendition of an intelligent ver-
dict, the jury cannot be required to determine what 
part of a contradictory charge is correct or left 
to reconcile conflicting principles of law; it ordin-
arily cannot be determined from the verdict which 
rule was adopted by the jury, the court is left in 
doubt and uncertainty as to the facts actually found 
by the jury as a basis for its verdict, and where 
instructions are inconsistent with, or contradict each 
other, it is usually impossible to say whether the 
jury was controlled by the one or the other." 
With this rule we have no quarrel. The court in the 
case cited then continued on to find whether the error in 
the instruction constituted "reversible" error, and con-
cluded in that case that it did because it was a measure cf 
the quantum of proof necessary to the defendant's convic-
tion. But the distinction between the case cited and the 
case before this court is so manifest as to hardly need 
more than comment. Any confusion in the instructions in 
the instant case was resolved by the finding of the jury 
that the plaintiff had no cause of action, and there has been 
no error pointed out in any instruction by which the jury 
was called upon to measure the evidence before it on that 
point. 
The second case cited by appellants, Sorensen v. Bell, 
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51 Utah 262, 170 P. 72 we believe outlines the rule applic-
able to the situation in this case. In that case the instruc-
tions before the Supreme Court for review had to do with 
a personal injury case. The particular instruction was de-
termined to be erroneous and in conflict with another also 
given which was correct but the court in considering wheth-
er or not reversal was necessary said, 
"Where such is the case, and the evidence is con-
flicting upon the subject covered by the instruc-
tions, or is such that more than one conclusion is 
permissible, and the record leaves it in doubt wheth-
er the jury followed the instruction that is proper 
or the one that is improper, then but one result 
is legally permissible in this court, and that is to 
reverse the judgment and grant a new trial to the 
aggrieved party. * * *" (Italics ours) 
In the case at bar we direct this court's attention 
again to the fact that the jury left no doubt as to its 
action. There is no conflicting instruction on anything save 
the measure of damages. The only claimed error in the 
instruction on liability militated to the benefit of the ap-
pellants as we have hereinbefore set out and still the jury 
found appellants had no cause of action. It is our position 
that under the facts and the evidence as it stood before 
the jury and as disclosed by the record on appeal there was 
no other conclusion permissible than that arrived at by the 
jury. 
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POINT V. 
THE VERDICT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVI-
DENCE AND IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW. 
POINT VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
Appellants in their brief at point 5 claim that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the verdict against the 
plaintiffs of no cause of action and the verdict of the jury 
in that regard is contrary to law. We find no argument 
in the brief on this point and under the doctrine announced 
in Felkner v. Smith, supra, we assume the appellants have 
abandoned this point. The appellants do, however, argue 
under their third heading that the verdict of the jury 
on respondents' counterclaim is not supported by the evi-
dence and is contrary to the law. The basis of the argu-
ment is that since the jury awarded the respondents only 
$400.00 of a total amount claimed by respondents of $1,-
107.47 that the jury must have been confused by the court's 
instructions and, therefore, there is reversible error. We 
submit that this is not the fact. In the first place, the 
appellants' argument amounts to a statement that the 
respondents did not get enough damages. This argument 
will not be entertained by an appellate court. 3 Am. J ur. 
"Appeal and Error" at page 656, Section 1139 states, 
"Whether or not defects and errors in the ver-
dict or findings in an action necessitate or justify 
reversal of the judgment or decree depends, just as 
has been stated with respect to other errors, upon 
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their effect upon the substantial rights or liabilities 
of the parties. If the judgment or decree is either 
not affected at all or is not affected in a way which 
is prejudicial to the party complaining, the defect 
or error may be disregarded by the reviewing 
court." 
The same authority states at Section 821, Page 362, 
"An appeal brings up for review only that 
which is decided adversely to the appellant. * * *" 
It is unusual to find an appellant complaining that the 
damages assessed against him are not sufficient and con-
sequently one does not find authority in the case law deter-
mining on appeal the effect of a jury verdict against ap-
pellants where appellants claim the damages are less than 
the amount respondents should have received. However, 
one finds a vast amount of case law on the subject of ex-
cessive damages, and the rules there applied seem to be 
applicable to the principle involved herein. That is, 
"The damages assessed by the jury will not as 
a general rule be disturbed on appeal on the ground 
that it is excessive unless it is so excessive under 
the particular circumstances of the case, as to de-
monstrate that the jury has acted against the rules 
of law, or have suffered their passions, their pre-
judices, or their perverse disregard of the law to 
mislead them. * * *" 3 Am. Jur. Appeal and Error, 
Page 452, Section 893. 
We are not confronted here with any such conduct by 
the jury. Their action is entirely explainable by perfectly 
logical views of the evidence which cannot be complained 
of by the appellants. In the first place, the record makes 
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manifest a conflict in the documentary and the verbal 
testimony which was never at any time explained to the 
jury and which by the acceptance of the documentary proof 
as opposed to the verbal testimony would readily explain 
the reduction in the damage award to respondents on their 
counterclaim. In connection with the examination of Dr. 
Schick, counsel for the respondents read to the jury and 
ultimately introduced into evidence, a letter from Ashton, 
Evans and Brazier, respondents, to Dr. Schick, which letter 
was dated September 30, 1953. (R 600 Ex. 45. R 359) 
Whereas, all of the verbal testimony of both Mr. Brazier 
and Dr. Schick had referred to the architect's fee as 6% 
of the construction cost, the document referred to states, 
"In order to accommodate your financial situ-
ation (although according to our practice procedure 
we should have billed you as of June 1, 1953) we 
withheld billing for professional services rendered 
in preparing documents until August 1, 1953, for 
4% of the General Contract. As of this date no 
payment has been made. We, therefore, are attach-
ing hereto our statment as itemized for professional 
services to date, requesting that payment be made." 
(Italics ours) 
The statement referred to in the letter was not sub-
mitted to the jury. Without explanation the letter appears 
to set the architect's fee at 4% rather than 6% of the 
general contract. Actually the fact, had it been proved, 
was that this was a partial billing. However, no explan-
ation was ever given to the jury. This was the only demand 
for payment by respondents which was testified to or 
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presented to the jury. Calculating the architects fee at 
4% of the $34,000.00 plus which Mrs. Schick testified the 
cost of the house to be (R 276) or applied to the $35,-
124.00 alleged in respondents' counterclaim (R 4, 582) as 
the construction cost brings the architect's fee to almost 
the exact figure of $1400.00 which the jury allowed. It must 
be remembered that it had been testified that $1,000.00 
of the fee had been paid, thus leaving the balance of $400.00 
which the jury awarded to defendants on their counter-
claim. 
This theory brings the award well within the province 
of the jury in determining the amount of damages and 
the award is neither speculative, or a compromise. As we 
first stated, it is not the appellants who should be heard 
to complain if the respondents were not awarded all that 
they should have received. 
One further word should be said with regard to the 
overall question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-
port the verdict, both on the plaintiffs' complaint - no 
cause of action, and on the defendants' counterclaim. More 
than in the usual case, it should be remembered that the 
jury is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses. It 
is the jury that heard and saw the witnesses. It is the jury 
that had the opportunity to formulate their views as to 
the validity of the complaints by Dr. Schick, a man who 
told the jury he couldn't read a blueprint, and didn't 
understand about construction and diagrams of construc-
tion, ( R 372) but who wrote pages of detailed instruc-
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tions to the architects and demanded drawings and details 
and pointed out flaws which he found in the drawings 
submited to him and who couldn't be satisfied with the 
ordinary in any phase of the construction. (R 600, ~x.'s 
35, 42, 43, 4 7, 49) The same man who testified he had 
never requested that space in the furnace room be used as 
a dark room, (R 352) but who wrote a memorandum to 
respondents stating he had details on a dark room from 
Eastman and demanding a sketch of the proposed instal-
lation. (R 600, Ex. 43) The jury heard Mr. Hassell, the 
engineer relied upon by appellants to prove the deficiency 
of the heating system, when he had to admit that the state-
ment of counsel as to the manner in which the fans used 
in the furnace installed in the Schick residence derived 
their load was correct, and yet refused to admit that his 
written report to Dr. Schick was in error wherein it con-
tained a statement as to how the fans derived their load 
which was exactly contrary to the statement of counsel. 
(R 201, 202) The jury heard the contractor relied upon 
by the appellants, Mr. Pons, who knew all about every-
thing, knew all about the heating system, and the insul-
ation and the repairs necessary, and then had to admit 
that he had never seen the plans for the construction of the 
house as designed by respondents until the day before the 
trial and had only looked at them then because he thought 
he might be asked a question on them. ( R 250) 
It is hardly necessary to remind this court that the 
verdict of the jury should not be lightly disturbed. Appel-
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lants have not expressly argued their point 7, that the 
court erred in overruling the motion for new trial. Again 
referring to the principle announced in Felkner v. Smith, 
supra, we assume that this has been abandoned as a sep-
arate ground upon which to base this appeal, but since the 
principles there involved are so closely related and inte-
grated with the question of the sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain the verdict we have combined our position there-
on and have presented the argument as one matter. We 
believe that the trial court correctly denied the motion for 
new trial. As we have elsewhere in our argument pointed 
out, none of the errors complained of by appellants are 
in any way prejudicial to the appellants. Considering the 
evidence as a whole, and the record before this court, we 
submit that no other reasonable conclusion could be reach-
ed other than that arrived at by the jury. The attempt 
of the appellants to avoid the consequences of their own 
refusal to abide by the plans as drawn by the architects, 
and to blame the effects of their penuriousness on the 
respondents instead of admitting that the changes they 
themselves insisted upon were the cause of whatever dis-
tress they claimed to have suffered, real or imagined, was 
so patent from the testimony elicited before the jury that it 
is difficult to conceive how any other verdict could have 
been derived. 
We refer the court to the statement in 3 Am. Jur. 
"Appeal and Error, Section 1111, Page 634, 
"* * * When the undisputed evidence estab-
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lishes the correctness of the verdict, so that either 
with or without the erroneous instruction the ver-
dict could not have been otherwise than it was and, 
had it been otherwise, it would have been set aside 
by the court, or if the result is one that might 
properly be directed by the court, technical errors 
will be disregarded." 
This court in the case of Krantz v. Rio Grande Western 
Ry. Co., 12 Utah 104, 41 P. 717 announced a doctrine 
which to this day remains the law of the state, 
"We are of the opinion from this record that 
the appellant is entitled to recover from the rail-
road company, and are not disposed and do not find 
it necessary to put him to the expense and trouble 
of a new trial. 'Why should a verdict be set aside 
which is correct, because erroneous principles of 
law have been announced by the court? The object 
of a jury trial being to do justice between the par-
ties the annulment of the verdict, where this has 
been accomplished, on account of mistakes and mis-
directions on the part of the court, would seem akin 
to the criticism which censured a celebrated com-
mander because he persisted in winning victories in 
violation of the rules of strategy.' Railroad Co. v. 
Burke, 53 Miss. 227." 
We submit that justice has been done between the 
parties to this action and that the verdict should be sus-
tained. 
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CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court 
entered thereon, and the ruling of the court on appellants' 
motion for new trial are correct and should be affirmed 
with costs to the respondents. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALLEN H. TIBBALS 
BOYDEN, TIBBALS, STATEN & CROFT 
Attorneys for Defendants and Respondents 
351 South State, Suite #2 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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